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Washington's Way: Dispersed Enforcement of Growth
Management Controls and the Crucial Role of NGOs
Henry W. McGee, Jr.t
[W]hen people were on the Oregon Trail, there was a sign
in Oregon Cities: "Oregon is the End of the Oregon Trail,"
and all the people who could read stopped in Oregon and
all who couldn't went to Washington.'
I. INTRODUCTION
While growth management laws might not be pervasive, many
states have some form of legislative scheme to cope with the governmen-
tal and environmental impacts of urban sprawl,2 a global phenomenon
that has come to define twenty-first century cities.3 These statewide
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1. Interview by Diane Wiatr with Michael J. McCormick, former CTED assistant director,
1969-94 (Jul. 18, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH864.pdf.
2. Douglas R. Porter, State Framework Laws for Guiding Urban Growth and Conservation in
the United States, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 547, 555-56 (1996).
3. Edward H. Ziegler, China's Cities, Globalization, and Sustainable Development: Compara-
tive Thoughts on Urban Planning, Energy, and Environmental Policy, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES
L. REV. 296, 304 (2006). Most major metropolitan areas throughout the industrialized world experi-
enced some degree of outward sprawling during the latter half of the twentieth century. In the
United States, however, the densities in these sprawling development areas have generally been so
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strategies to limit the hyper-growth of cities vary in substance 4 and have
had varying degrees of success. Large urban areas continue to struggle
to prevent city populations from spilling into open space areas on their
periphery and swallowing open space and farm land-both of which may
have disastrous consequences for the environment, energy consumption,
and the quality of urban life. 5
Arguably, two of the most notable growth management laws cre-
ated to address the problem of urban sprawl are those of Oregon and
Washington. These two states have enacted contrasting statutory growth
management frameworks, even though their environments are quite simi-
lar in terms of topography and ecology.6 Both Oregon and Washington
require certain counties and cities to engage in comprehensive planning;
this planning is meant to encourage development within designated ur-
ban growth areas and to protect farmland, forests, and critical environ-
mental areas.' However, Washington politicians created a dispersed/
"bottom up" approach to growth management as opposed to Oregon's
hallmark strategy of a centralized/"top-down" approach. 8 More impor-
tantly, Oregon enacted a centralized, statewide plan with legislatively
mandated enforcement from a single government entity, while Washing-
ton enacted a scheme in which enforcement of the Growth Management
Act ("GMA") was left to non-governmental organizations ("NGOs")
acting at the local level.
Moreover, Oregon requires all counties and cities to submit com-
prehensive plans to a state agency for "acknowledgment" before enacting
corresponding development regulations, 9 while Washington's GMA re-
quires only certain counties and cities to complete comprehensive plans
low that, by a worldwide standard, the resulting built-environment can appropriately be called "hy-
persprawl." European densities, by contrast, are about ten times greater than development densities
in the United States. Moreover, densities in Asian cities can be fifteen or twenty times greater than
those in many developed areas of the United States. Suburban densities in some developing areas of
the United States are less than twenty residential dwellings per square mile. See id
4. David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: A Quarter Century of Urban Progress, 26
URB. LAW. 197, 207-10 (1994); Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management
Revolution in Washington: Past, Present, and Future, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 867, 896-98
(1993).
5. Porter, supra note 2, at 496-97.
6. McGeveran, infra note 66, at 444-45; WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2006); OR. REV. STAT.
197 (2005).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. 197.010 (2005).
8. The programs are typically referred to by the community of persons working in the field as
"top down" for Oregon and "bottom up" for Washington. This Article describes them as "central-
ized" and "dispersed" in an effort to be more accurate and less value-laden.
9. Hong N. Huynh, Administrative Forces in Oregon's Land Use Planning and Washington
Growth Management Act, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITG. 115, 118-20 (1997).
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before they may enact necessary development regulations.' 0 The ap-
proval required for these plans and regulations is important because they
are presumed valid until a constituent of the state petitions a state hear-
ings board and the board rules against the local government." Despite
these contrasting enforcement methods, both the Washington and Oregon
acts share similar goals of protecting open space, critical areas, and farm
lands, as well as encouraging vibrant and more densely populated urban
areas.' 2 Thus, regardless of their differences, the Washington and Ore-
gon schemes place the two states at the forefront of growth management
in the United States,' 3 making a discussion of their contrasts all the more
important.
Though there is a valuable and extensive collection of literature on
anti-sprawl efforts in both states, this Article examines Washington's
Growth Management Act and the critical role that NGOs play in support-
ing the GMA. Specifically, this Article looks at Washington's GMA
from three perspectives-legal, historical, and empirical-and proposes
that NGOs are vital to the GMA's enforcement. Because NGOs are so
critical to the enforcement of the GMA, the question of how the courts
interpret the scope of authority of growth management hearing boards
when deciding growth management cases becomes very important. A
decrease in the authority of the hearing boards would restrict the NGO's
ability to act as the trustees of the GMA and enforce the GMA's goals
and requirements. Legal, historical, and empirical analyses are also cen-
tral to an understanding of dispersed versus centralized growth manage-
ment laws and the different enforcement powers given to GMA organiza-
tions.
Part II of this Article outlines Washington's approach to growth
management, describing the differences between dispersed and central-
ized approaches to the enforcement of growth management laws, the
structure and legislative background of Washington's GMA, and the or-
ganizations involved in enforcing the GMA. Part III provides an empiri-
cal analysis of the enforcement of the GMA over the last ten years, ex-
amining particular cases involving developers and the NGO Futurewise.
Finally, Part IV concludes with a brief summary.
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040 (2006).
11. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 901.
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. 197.010 (2005).
13. Washington adopted its first planning law in 1959, but Oregon became the model growth
management state when it adopted its growth management legislation in 1973. S.B. 100, 57th Leg.
Sess. (Or. 1973); S.B. 101, 57th Leg. Sess. (Or. 1973).
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II. WASHINGTON'S DISPERSED APPROACH
Although this Article's primary audience is policy makers and
lawyers who are familiar with the GMA, a brief description of
Washington's law, relevant institutions, and the general theory behind
the review, approval, and enforcement mechanisms of the GMA is nec-
essary to aid both the primary audience and the general reader., 4 This
general information provides the framework within which we can ana-
lyze whether the current GMA structure will ensure local legislative ac-
tions are compliant with the GMA. When discussing the general theories
and institutions of the GMA, it is first important to define the terms "dis-
persed" and "centralized." Once these general definitions are under-
stood, it is then necessary to specifically describe Washington's GMA
structure, legislative history, and the organizations involved in its en-
forcement.
A. Dispersed v. Centralized Defined
To understand the success of public policy groups in enforcing the
GMA's goals and requirements, it is first helpful to understand precisely
how dispersed and centralized approaches differ, and how these differ-
ences impact the enforcement of the GMA. In structuring a state-wide
growth management law, there are nearly an infinite number of possibili-
ties along the continuum of absolute state control to absolute local con-
trol. Consider the interplay of the law's goals, requirements, state
agency rulemaking authority, the ability to appeal to administrative
boards or state courts, deference given to local decisions, and various
alternatives that could be dreamed up for different elements. This Article
will begin with the absolutes. For the purposes of this Article, "absolute
centralized" means a growth management approach where the state cre-
ates the local comprehensive plans and dictates what development regu-
lations local governments shall adopt. By contrast, "absolute dispersed"
refers to an approach where the state establishes broad goals, but local
governments create their own comprehensive plans and development
regulations with state guidance but no state oversight. Washington's
14. For further background information, see Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4; Wm. H. Nielsen,
M. Peter Philley, & Chris Smith Towne, Practice & Procedure Before the Growth Planning Hear-
ings Boards, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1323 (1993); Jared B. Black, The Land Use Study Com-
mission and the 1997 Amendments to Washington State's Growth Management Act, 22 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 559 (1998); Richard L. Settle, Washington's Growth Management Revolution Goes
to Court, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 5 (1999); Eric S. Laschever, An Overview of Washington's Growth
Management Act, 7 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 657 (1998); Samuel W. Plauch & Amy L. Kosterlitz,
Road Map to the Revolution: A Practical Guide to Procedural Issues Before the Growth Manage-
ment Hearings Boards, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 71 (1999).
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GMA structure is characterized in this Article as dispersed because that
characterization is descriptive of how the GMA is enforced.
B. Washington's GMA Structure
In Washington, the duty to ensure that local legislative actions are
compliant with the GMA falls upon members of the public who can es-
tablish standing as petitioners to quasi-adjudicative agencies called
"growth management hearings boards."' 5 Until a local legislative action
is challenged through one of these hearing boards by a constituent, the
local action is presumed compliant.' 6 Private citizens or local govern-
ments have a sixty-day window to bring any such challenge before a
hearings board. 17 Thereafter, the board must set a hearing date within ten
days and make a decision regarding whether or not the local action com-
plies with the GMA within 180 days of receiving a petition, subject to
extensions.18 Section 36.70A.280(2) of the Washington Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") defines the class of people who have standing to
challenge local government decisions under the GMA. The definition is
broad and includes:
(a) The state, or a county or city that plans under [the GMA];
(b) A person who has participated orally or in writing before the
county or city regarding the matter on which a review is being re-
quested;
(c) A person who is certified by the governor within sixty days of
filing the request with the board; or
(d) A person qualified pursuant to RCW 34.05.530 [standing under
Washington's Administrative Procedure Act].19
Most petitioners use subsection (b) of the statute to gain standing
based on participation in the matter for which review is sought. Public
interest organizations also gain standing through this provision, either
through their local members who have participated in council meetings
and public hearings or through their letters and comments on comprehen-
sive plans and amendments to local governments.
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.260 (2006).
16.Id. § 36.70A.320.
17. Id. § 36.70A.290(2).
18. Id. § 36.70A.300(2).
19. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(2) with WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.530 (2006).
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Before the hearings boards, the burden is on the petitioner to per-
suade the board that a local legislative action does not comply with the
GMA.2° In reviewing local actions, hearings boards apply the "clearly
erroneous" standard of review.21 If a petitioner establishes standing to
bring a challenge before the board but receives an adverse decision, the
petitioner can appeal the board's decision to the Washington State Supe-
rior Court at the county level within thirty days of the board's final or-
der.
22
In addition to orders from the hearings board, compliance with the
GMA is assured through gubernatorial penalties.23 If a hearings board
recommends a penalty be imposed,24 the governor may do the following:
(1) [D]irect the director of the office of financial management to re-
vise allotments in appropriation levels;
(2) [D]irect the state treasurer to withhold the portion of revenues to
which the county or city is entitled under one or more of the follow-
ing: the motor vehicle fuel tax ... ; the transportation improvement
account ... ; the urban arterial trust account ... ; the sales and use
tax ... ; the liquor profit tax... ; and the liquor excise tax... ; or
(3) [D]irect the secretary of state to] temporarily rescind the county
or city's authority to collect the real estate excise tax .... 25
In practice, gubernatorial penalties have been few and far between;
the hearings board orders apparently have been sufficient. In turn, the
orders are generally enforced by organizations and public interest groups
associated with the GMA.
C. Legislative History and Intent
1. Legislative History
An examination of the GMA's legislative history is critical to un-
derstanding the degree of dispersion of the GMA, as well as the absence
of any official executive enforcement agency ordained by the GMA.
Ultimately, the legislative history sheds some light on whether the GMA
was meant to be dispersed or centralized in nature. The GMA's legisla-
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(2) (2006).
21. lId. § 36.70A.320(3).
22. Id. § 36.70A.300(5).
23. Id. § 36.70A.340.
24. Id. § 36.70A.330(3).
25. Id. § 36.70A.340.
[Vol. 3 1:1
Enforcement of Growth Management controls
tive history began with adoption of Washington's first comprehensive
planning law in 1959,26 which provided a planning structure that counties
could opt into. As to the law's actual comprehensiveness, its only re-
quirements were that counties consider land use and transportation circu-
lation elements. 27 The law left as optional considerations such as con-
servation, solar energy, transportation, transit, public buildings, housing,
redevelopment, and capital improvement programs. 28  Few counties
adopted such plans.
Though Washington adopted its first planning law in 1959, it was
Oregon that became the model growth management state when it adopted
its growth management legislation in 1973.29 Washington's first attempt
at mandatory county and city comprehensive planning on par with Ore-
gon came the following year in 1974. Though Washington Governor
Dan Evans had previously pushed through two significant state environ-
mental laws in the form of the State Environmental Protection Act and
the Shoreline Management Act, 30 this attempt at statewide growth man-
agement failed in the wake of Oregon's law.3'
The next attempt at growth management legislation did not come
until 1989. Joe King, then Speaker of the Washington State House of
Representatives, made his first effort at passing growth management leg-
islation by stalling the passage of a gas tax bill until his growth manage-
ment bill was also passed.32 Because King's bill was new and not well-
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.010 (1959).
27. Id.
28. Id. §§ 36.70.330-.340.
29. S.B. 100, 57th Leg. Sess. (Or. 1973); S.B. 101, 57th Leg. Sess. (Or. 1973).
30. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C, 90.58 (1971).
31. Joe Haussler, a conservative House Representative and Chair of the Local Government
Committee, proposed House Bill 168 in 1974; it was modeled after Oregon's law but with less state
control and more local control. The legislation went nowhere for the next two years and was rein-
troduced as House Bill 65 in 1977 to no avail. Interview by Rita R. Robison with Steve Ludin, senior
counsel to Wash. State House of Representatives (retired) (July 19, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH816.pdf.
32. An anecdote of fame is that of Joe King, Speaker of the House for Washington State. Tom
Campbell, who was King's senior executive assistant from 1987 to 1993 and who studied city plan-
ning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, tells the story:
The speaker and I were in a traffic jam on 1-405 one day and we were under a significant
amount of pressure by a broad coalition of labor and business interests to pass the gas tax
at that time. There was a significant interest in putting more money into roads. The
Speaker, Joe King, leans to me and says, "Look at those apartment buildings going up,
who's responsible for those?" I said, "Well, funny you should ask because there is no-
body who is centrally or even regionally responsible for this and that has any authority.
Essentially, Mr. Speaker, there is no accountability for growth, or land use and therefore
our transportation dollars. Well, there's no way to make our transportation dollars effi-
20071
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debated, a Growth Strategies Commission was created to analyze the
issue and recommend legislation. It was not long after this first attempt
by King that the 1990 legislative session passed the first components of
the Growth Management Act.
33
The 1990 GMA required certain local governments to do the fol-
lowing: (1) enact comprehensive development plans;34 (2) set urban
growth areas;35 (3) consider certain elements when planning including
land use, housing, capital facilities, utilities, rural areas, transportation,
economic development, and parks; (4) adopt development restrictions;
36
and (5) establish concurrency requirements for new developments. 37  It
also created a legal framework for public participation and coordination
between neighboring jurisdictions.38 Most of the law only applied to the
largest, fastest growing counties and their cities, leaving smaller counties
the choice of whether to comply. 39 Although the law was a step in the
right direction, it failed to create any oversight for interpretation, rule-
making, arbitration, or adjudication, and it also failed to establish penal-
ties for non-compliance.4 °
cient because there's no sense of accountability by which someone can bring the priori-
ties of transportation and land use together-the two sides don't work together. On the
one side you have more and more permits, more buildings and capital facilities. On the
other hundreds of local governments that have really no accountability or coordination
with one another. So, if you really want to make a difference in spending our infrastruc-
ture dollars on transportation, you have to have growth management." And that sparked
the plan that we developed .... And the speaker in 1989 said, "I will not pass a gas tax
unless we have growth management to go together simultaneously."
Interview by Rita R. Robison with Tom Campbell, senior executive assistant of policy for Joe King,
Speaker of the Wash. House of Representatives and former deputy director of Community Trade and
Economic Development ("CTED") (July 26, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH867.pdf.
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2006).




38.Id. §§ 36.70A.035, .100.
39.1d. § 36.70A.040(l).
40. One of the reasons that the 1990 GMA lacked any hearings boards or state oversight re-
quirements might be Representative Busse Nutley, who stated:
The growth boards were not part of the original legislation and in part because of me. It
was this local governance piece, the bottom-up approach and I really felt that tying that to
any proposal that was out there for what the state's role was to be, was still too strong and
wasn't going to work politically. After this session I ran for county commissioner in
Clark County and was elected. So, I was done with the legislation. The following year
they went back and put the growth hearings boards together .... [A]gain I was opposed
to having the state's role very strong at all.
Enforcement of Growth Management controls
The legislature filled this enforcement gap in the 1991 legislative
session but ultimately left enforcement to local control.4 1  The 1991
GMA enactment (1) established three regional growth management hear-
ings boards to hear petitions from citizens contesting a local legislative
action as violating the GMA; 42 (2) established the deference owed to lo-
cal decisions by the hearings boards;43 (3) established penalties for non-
compliance; 44 (4) required local governments to site essential public fa-
cilities;45 (5) required certain counties to establish county-wide planning
policies to implement comprehensive plans;46 (6) allowed new, fully con-
tained communities and master planned resorts outside of urban growth
areas ("UGAs"); 47 (7) established materials and a curriculum for local
governments on how not to unconstitutionally take private property; 48 (8)
extended compliance dates; 49 and (9) created a pilot program adminis-
tered by the Washington State Department of Community Trade and
Economic Development ("CTED") with the goal of streamlining envi-
ronmental review.5° Unfortunately, the 1991 enactment did not provide
for a central, state-funded agency to enforce the GMA or for compliance
oversight. Consequently, dispersion remained the abiding method of
growth management in Washington.
2. Legislative Intent
In analyzing to what degree the GMA is dispersed or centralized, it
is also important to determine the legislative intent behind the GMA's
Interview by Diane Wiatr with Busse Nutley, member of the Wash. House of Representatives, chair
of the Housing Committee, 1990, commissioner of Clark County, 1991-99, director of CTED (Aug.
1, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH814.pdf.
41. Because the 1991 session expired without any growth management legislation enacted,
Governor Booth Gardner demanded that the House and Senate work out the final details in a special
"Five Comers Committee." At the same time, a group of local governments, developers, and real-
tors drafted another version, which could be aptly described as "GMA-light." Senate Majority
leader Jeannette Hayner rejected the developer group's proposal and pushed through the Five Cor-
ners' negotiated version, thus concluding the second enactment. For a good procedural history of
the 1991 GMA legislation, see Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 892-96; see also Interview by Rita
R. Robison with Joe King, Speaker of the Wash. House of Representatives, 1986-92 (Aug. 3, 2005),
available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH811 .pdf.
42. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.250-.310 (2006).
43. Id. §§ 36.70A.320-.330.
44. Id. § 36.70A.340.
45. Id. § 36.70A.200.
46. Id. § 36.70A.210.
47. Id. §§ 36.70A.350-.360.
48. Id. § 36.70A.370.
49. Id. § 36.70A.380.
50. Id. § 36.70A.385.
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creation. This intent can be seen in the motives that drove the creation of
the GMA, including the roles of the boards and CTED. Legislative in-
tent also plays a role in a discussion of the importance of the distinction
between dispersed and centralized growth management schemes.
(a) Legislative Motives Behind Dispersed vs. Centralized
No adequate record exists of the thought processes underlying the
1990 and 1991 GMA enactments. The reasons for the creation of the
dispersed approach in the establishment of the three hearings boards, the
presumption of validity of local legislative actions, the burden of proof,
and the standard of review were instead discerned largely from newspa-
per articles, institutional histories, and recorded interviews of the key
players during the two enactments.
The decision to adopt a dispersed approach to growth management
was made to ensure that comprehensive plans complied with statewide
goals and requirements, and that decisions did not occur within a vac-
uum. Though Oregon's law served as a model for Washington, many
legislators set out to create a system that was completely opposite.51
51. Whatever the merits of the perception, those involved in the GMA creation believed there
were differences between Washington and Oregon which necessitated a tailoring of growth man-
agement legislation to Washington state. As Michael McCormick stated:
I'd heard Joe King say if it worked in Oregon it won't work in Washington .... We ada-
mantly said, "We're very different from Oregon, this isn't Oregon, this is Washington."
In fact I had a joke that I told over and over and over again and that was about why one
state was different than the other. And my joke was that when people were on the Ore-
gon Trail there was a sign in Oregon cities: "Oregon is the End of the Oregon Trail," and
all the people who could read stopped in Oregon and all who couldn't went to Washing-
ton [laughter]. A lot of people found it was humorous, but there really were some other
fundamental political differences in the two states. Washington has a very populist tradi-
tion, Oregon doesn't. Oregon was settled by people that were landowners, it was concen-
trated in the Willamette Valley. That's where the political power was until very recently.
Washington was very different. Washington was populated by people that built railroads,
that worked in the forest, that went to Alaska, and there was a strong populist tradition
which you can see reflected in our constitution. State power is really diffused and that
was consciously done in 1889 by the drafters of the state constitution because they were
afraid of a concentration of power, and the concentration they were afraid of was the rail-
roads. And there was some long history, the Wobblies, the battle in Everett-we politi-
cally are very different with a different history.
Interview by Diane Wiatr with Michael J. McCormick, former CTED assistant director, 1969-94
(Julyl8, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH864.pdf. This was the
logic floating in the legislative halls in 1990 and 1991. Perhaps this logic was a fagade for other
political considerations, such as providing consolations to the development community, but several
of the interviews with individuals involved with the CTED express this same reasoning for the dis-
persed approach.
[Vol. 3 1:1
Enforcement of Growth Management controls
Several factors contributed to the decisions to adopt a structure different
from that of Oregon. 52
First, an environmental coalition sponsored a statewide initiative in
the fall of 1990 to replace the first GMA enactment.53 This initiative was
intended to provide a strong, centralized enforcement approach similar to
Oregon's law and would require all counties and cities to engage in com-
prehensive planning and submit their plans to a state agency for ap-
proval.54 Although the general public favored managing growth, devel-
opers and legislators successfully fended off this new growth manage-
ment initiative.55 The coalition promised not to run the initiative in the
fall if the legislature passed a strong act. 6 This provided the Legislature
with an incentive to pass legislation as strong as politically possible.
In reaction to 1-547 being put to the fall ballot, legislators, local
governments, and businesses swung behind the legislators' promises for
stronger growth management legislation. 7 On September 28, 1990, the
Four Comers Agreement was signed by House Speaker Joe King, House
Minority Leader Clyde Ballard, Senate Majority Leader Jeannette
Hayner, and Senate Minority Leader Larry Vognid, establishing an
agreement with voters that the Legislature would revisit the GMA's
shortcomings. 58 Ultimately, 1-547 was defeated by a three-to-one mar-
gin.59 Despite its failure, 1-547 had two beneficial effects for advocates
of growth management. The first was to pressure the legislature to adopt
significant legislation in 1990; the second was to force the legislative
leaders to sign the Four Comers Agreement.
52. Furthermore, no burden of proof is assigned in the administrative proceeding of approving
comprehensive plans in Oregon. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.350(3) (2005). While the Land Use Board of
Appeals hears cases regarding moratoriums, all other litigation related to compliance with compre-
hensive planning is channeled through the Oregon Land Conservation and Development Commis-
sion ("LCDC") and is then appealed through the state court system. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.505-540
(2005).
53. Interview by Diane Wiatr with David A. Bricklin, former president & director of the Wash.
Envtl. Council, former co-chair of the Wash. Conservation Voters, proponent of Initiative 547 in
1990, founding member & director of Futurewise (formerly 1000 Friends of Wash.) (Aug. 23, 2005),
available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH829.pdf.
54. Id. The coalition's Initiative 547 would have created a state commission to review the






59. Washington Secretary of State, Initiatives to the People-1914 through 2006
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/statisticsinitiatives.aspx (last visited Feb. 15,
2007).
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Second, Washington had already passed strong centralized envi-
ronmental legislation with little deference to local decisions in the
Shoreline Management Act. 60  The Department of Ecology's authority
under the Shoreline Management Act is nearly the same as the Oregon
Land Conservation and Development Commission's ("LCDC") author-
ity.61 Thus, from a political context, the fact that the LCDC's function
was already being performed in Washington contributed to a loss of po-
62litical momentum for a centralized approach to growth management.
Finally, although Republicans in control of the Senate felt political
pressure from suburban constituents to enact a growth management
law,63 they were not about to abandon their political base of developers
and businesses.64 Businesses and developers wanted to keep control of
60. The Shorelines Management Act required local governments to adopt master shoreline
plans and development restrictions to protect shorelines of rivers, streams, and lakes. WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.58.020 (2006). The state Department of Ecology creates rules and guidelines for local
governments to follow and reviews and approves local shoreline master plans. WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 90.58.060, 90.58.090 (2006). Thus, from a legal context, there seems to be little political neces-
sity for a dispersed approach. See also Interview by Rita R. Robison with Steve Lundin, senior
counsel for the Wash. House of Representatives, 1973-2000, primary drafter of the GMA, 1990-91
(Jul. 19, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH816.pdf. The Shoreline
Management Act does provide a check on its "centralized" approach. Local governments and private
citizens may appeal the Department of Ecology's decisions, guidelines, and rules to the Shorelines
Hearings Board. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.090,.180-.195 (2006).
61. Compare WASH. REV. CODE 90.58.170-.240 (2006) with OR. REV. STAT. § 197.505-540
(2005).
62. There is a historical difference between land use regulation, which dates to the 1910s, and
waterway regulation, which dates to English common law. Land use and real estate were regulated
at the local level with minimal state interference; shorelines and waterways have always been regu-
lated by the state. Changing the status quo often faces stiff resistance.
63. The pressure for growth management became significant for local politicians in the fall of
1989. In a Republican primary of a typically conservative district, King County councilmember Bill
Reams was unseated by slow-growth advocate Brian Derdowski. Mary Rothschild, County winner:
'It Will Be Tough Now:' Derdowski Humble in Upset Over Councilman Reams, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 21, 1981, at A8, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/archives/1989/8901250495.asp. Additionally, Republican King
County Executive Tim Hill, a proponent of growth management, faced a stiff challenge from a sup-
posedly more radical slow-growth advocate, Democrat Bruce Hilyer. Mary Rothschild, Two races
hang on absentees, maybe recounts, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 9, 1989, at A9, available
at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/archives/1989/8901300074.asp. Hill won by a thin 3,928 votes.
Neil Modie, Once more absentees saved Hill. His supporters stayed home & voted by mail, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 15, 1989, at BI, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/archives/1989/8901300658.asp. Republicans heard this message:
Growth management is necessary to appease their base.
64. The business community believed the semantics of "bottom-up" worked in their favor.
Reflecting on Initiative 547 in 1990, Joe Tovar said, "the leading opposition to [1-547] was from the
building community, who were scared to death of an even more directly centralized system than the
Growth Management Act." Interview by Diane Wiatr with Joe Tovar, president of Wash. City Plan-
ning Directors (Jul. 17, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH833.pdf,
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growth management for several reasons, having spent much of the prior
seventy years working with local governments and establishing political
relationships as land use regulations were applied. Developers typically
have much more control over their fate when land use decisions are made
by county and city councils rather than by a state agency. Dealing with
an apolitical, state administrative board would have been a major set-
back for business as usual.65 This desire for control by developers was
another factor that supported the adoption of a more dispersed growth
management scheme.
Although these circumstances certainly frame the legislature's
choice of a dispersed approach, their underpinnings are not entirely logi-
cal. For example, whether Oregon is so different from Washington that
an opposite compliance mechanism is necessary is a questionable asser-
tion. The states have a number of things in common, such as the east-
west geographical divide created by the Cascade Mountains, 66 and the
fact that populations in both states live primarily on the west side.67
Moreover, the states' politics are similar with liberal cities and conserva-
tive rural areas at about the same ratios.68 Both states rely principally
upon hydroelectric energy 69 and the states' economies share several simi-
larities because both are focused on technology, international ports, and
see also Interview by Diane Wiatr with Enid Layes, vice president of governmental affairs for the
Ass'n of Wash. Bus., 1988-93 (Aug. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH831 .pdf.
65. The compromise for a dispersed approach with judicial oversight has not always gone as
planned. Besides control over local decisions, what developers really desire is certainty. By relying
on a quasi-judicial system instead of state administrative approval, the petition and appeals system
prolongs local land use decisions, putting into jeopardy developers' pro formas. One example is
Snoqualmie Ridge, Weyerhaeuser's master-planned community which was annexed by the City of
Snoqualmie. The project incurred significant delays due to legal haranguing from 1991 to 1997,
with two decisions before the state supreme court. Ultimately, Weyerhaeuser lost $65 million be-
cause of litigation of the project before the growth management hearings boards. Interview with
Pete Lymberis, Project Engineer for Quadrant Homes, Vice President of the Snoqualmie Ridge
Residential Owners Ass'n Board of Directors (April 20, 2006). See also Friends of Snoqualmie
Valley v. King County Boundary Bd. Review, 118 Wash. 2d, 488, 825 P.2d 300 (1992); Twin Falls
v. Snoqualmie County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 93-3-0003 (Sept. 7, 1993); King County v.
Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 91 Wash. App. 1, 951 P.2d 1151 (1998), rev'd by
138 Wash. 2d 161, 979 P.2d 374 (1999); Quadrant Corp v. State Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 119
Wash. App. 562, 572, 81 P.3d 918 (2003), rev'd in part by 154 Wash. 2d 224, 235-38, 110 P.3d
1132 (2005).
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agriculture.7° In fact, one could make the case that Washington should
be better suited politically for stronger growth management legislation
than Oregon considering its greater problems of sprawl, congestion, and
water management.
But whatever the case, the semantics of distinguishing a state as be-
ing different from its neighboring state has great political benefits. Thus,
when the legislature adopts substantially similar legislation to a
neighboring state's, it may be necessary to make political concessions by
changing the language of the law. To those adopting this philosophy, the
failure of the environmental coalitions' initiative gave credence to this
rhetoric by proving that Washingtonians did not want Oregon's central-
ized approach. With a Republican-controlled Senate, this was the pre-
vailing philosophy during the 1991 legislative session.
i. The Number of Boards
The number of hearings boards is an important aspect of the dis-
persed strategy. While the source of the idea for three regional based
hearings boards is murky,7' it is clear that the Legislature was motivated
by geography, politics, and allowing regional diversity in GMA interpre-
tation. As Tom Campbell, senior executive assistant of policy for Joe
King, Speaker of the Washington House of Representatives, stated:
[I]t was the politics; the difference between Western Washington or
generally the Puget Sound region and Eastern Washington .... Just
70. Id.
71. There are several stories as to who proposed having three regional hearings boards instead
of one. As remembered by Lucy Steers, the Land Use Section of the Washington State Bar Associa-
tion proposed the three regional hearings during the 1991 legislative session. Interview by Diane
Wiatr with Lucy Steers, president of League of Women Voters of Seattle, 1987-97, member of the
Growth Strategies Comm'n, and founding board member of Futurewise (Aug. 11, 2005), available
at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH827.pdf. Representative Wayne Ehlers provided
another explanation, believing that he himself came up with the idea as a way of balancing Republi-
can desire for no hearings boards and Democrat desire for one, statewide board. Interview by Diane
Wiatr with Wayne Ehlers, director of legislative & federal relations for the Office of the Governor,
1990-92 (Aug. 19, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH820.pdf.
Joe King provided a third explanation:
We set out to have two hearing boards rather than three and Senator Pat McMullen, a
good friend of mine . . . , who lived up in Sedro-Wooley proposed a third one. He
wanted to have one for Puget Sound, one for the rest of west of the Cascades, and one
east of the Cascades. I really think he did it because he had a friend of his that he wanted
to get appointed to the growth management hearings boards. And I think, if I remember
the story right, he succeeded in getting the hearings board set up for his area, but did not
succeed in getting his friend appointed.
Interview by Rita R. Robison with Joe King, Speaker of the Wash. House of Representatives, 1986-
92 (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH811 .pdf.
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politically, it started to look like an Oregon board if there was one
.... So we had to make it as politically palatable as possible and
that's why we created the three boards.
72
Thus, the issue of three boards versus one board was closely con-
nected to the issue of a "bottom-up"/dispersed approach versus a "top-
down"/centralized approach, and it revolved not so much around the
merits of the different approaches, but instead around semantics and dif-
ferentiation from Oregon.73 This is not to say the merits or benefits of
the chosen approach were not of concern during the 1991 GMA enact-
ment. The proponents of three boards argued that regional decisions
would be good for growth management because decisions would reflect
local circumstances. 74 Proponents also did not want urban counties dic-
tating policies to rural counties. 75  But ultimately, making the Washing-
ton approach appear different from that of Oregon was significant and
creating multiple regional boards was a substantial part of that.
Though important GMA framers were concerned that the three
hearings boards would lead to inconsistent decisions, regionalism, and
reduction of authority,76 they also recognized the advantages. One of the
greatest strengths of multiple boards existed in having board members
who understood local politics and who could provide "sensitivity to the
72. Interview by Rita R. Robison with Tom Campbell, senior executive assistant of policy for
Joe King, Speaker of the Wash. House of Representatives, 1987-93, former deputy director of
CTED, 1993-97 (July 26, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH867.pdf.
73. Interview by Diane Wiatr with Michael J. McCormick, supra note 55.
74. Charles Howard stated, "I think that was a good thing that happened because if it had just
one, Puget Sound would have tended to dominate and then the rest of the areas would have probably
felt a little bit more left out." Interview by Diane Wiatr with Charles Howard, director of strategic
planning & programming of the Wash. State Dep't of Transp., 1988-04 (Aug. 12, 2005), available
at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH830.pdf.
75. Interview by Diane Wiatr with Joe Tovar, president of Wash. City Planning Directors (July
17, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH833.pdf.
There was a lot of concem in Eastern Washington that we not have an act that would re-
sult in people from Seattle and Olympia telling people in Eastern Washington what to do.
They wanted to have some flexibility. They wanted to have some opportunity to only do
parts of what might be required of people in the more urban Seattle area. Id.
76. Interview by Rita R. Robison with Joe King, Speaker of the Wash. House of Representa-
tives, 1986-92 (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH811 .pdf;
Interview by Rita R. Robison with Tom Campbell, senior executive assistant of policy for Joe King,
Speaker of the Wash. House of Representatives, 1987-93, former deputy director of CTED 1993-97
(July 26, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH867.pdf; Interview by
Diane Wiatr with Mary McCumber, Executive Director of the Wash. Growth Strategies Comm'n,
1989-90 and founding member and president of Futurewise (July 27, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf!OH826.pdf.
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local point of view, but then could also be looking at case law over
time. 77 The fact that petitioners could appeal adverse board decisions to
the courts provided consistency among the hearings boards. 78 Because
they provided the necessary differentiation from Oregon as well as the
benefits of local knowledge, the creation of the three boards was ac-
cepted.79
ii. Absence of CTED Authority
in Rulemaking and Approval
Though the CTED is the GMA's main enforcement agency, two
notable powers were not given to the department: rulemaking and ap-
proval of comprehensive plans. In contrast, Oregon had given both au-
thorities to its LCDC. 80  Furthermore, under Washington's Shorelines
Management Act, the Department of Ecology's powers include approv-
ing local governments' shorelines master plans and rulemaking author-
ity. 8 1 Thus, the CTED's lack of authority is a significant departure.
Addressing why CTED did not receive rulemaking authority, lob-
byist Dave Williams82 explained that the Association of Washington Cit-
ies "resisted CTED getting rulemaking authority-to tell us how to do it,
by rule. We like guidance, we like suggestions, we don't like hard and
fast rules. 83 But Williams recognized that some planning professionals
77. Interview by Rita R. Robison with Tom Campbell, senior executive assistant of policy for
Joe King, Speaker of the Wash. House of Representatives, 1987-93, former deputy director of
CTED, 1993-97 (July 26, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH867.pdf.
78. Arguments that the courts would provide consistency, and that the boards could look at
case law over time, were merely arguments demonstrating that the three boards could be of equal
worthiness to one board. Interview by Diane Wiatr with Joe Tovar, president of Wash. City Plan-
ning Directors (July 17, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf!OH833.pdf.
But the number of boards should not be outcome determinative on the number of petitions for re-
view. In fact, the certainty of the law needed by developers is undermined by inconsistent decisions.
79. Lucy Steers stated, "Having traveled around the state with the Growth Strategies Commis-
sion, I understood the need for regional sensitivities. Because I saw first hand how incredibly differ-
ent philosophically and politically and issues-wise these areas were." Interview by Diane Wiatr with
Lucy Steers, president of League of Women Voters of Seattle, 1987-97, member of the Growth
Strategies Comm'n, and founding board member of Futurewise (Aug. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH827.pdf.
80. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.040(l)(c), .040(2)(a), .090(2)(a), .245 (2005).
81. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.060, .090 (2006).
82. Mr. Williams was the lobbyist for the Association of Washington Cities and was involved
in subsequent amendments. See Interview by Rita R. Robison with Dave Williams, lead lobbyist for
Association of Washington Cities, 1990-present (Sept. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH834.pdf.
83. Interview by Rita R. Robison with Dave Williams, lead lobbyist for Association of Wash-
ington Cities, 1990-present (Sept. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH834.pdf.
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saw the benefits of having rulemaking authority.84 Statewide rules pro-
vide more guidance to local planners, minimize the efforts of some juris-
dictions to attract business by having lax regulations, and provide politi-
cal cover to local officials by allowing them to say that "the state made
us do it." However, local officials were not prepared to publicly endorse
mandatory statewide rules, as to do so would have been political suicide
for some. 85 In addition, local officials have a sense of paternal sover-
eignty in their relationship to their jurisdiction, which a statewide ap-
proval process would infringe upon.
86
The absence of authority for comprehensive plan approval also has
a negative side. By having the comprehensive plans considered valid
upon adoption without any prior or subsequent requirement for approval
by a statewide agency such as CTED, noncompliance with the GMA can
only be found through the adjudicative process of the hearings boards.
There are many instances of noncompliance that could potentially slip
through simply because nobody petitions a hearings board for review.
Additionally, though some argue that the absence of an approval
requirement creates more litigation than there would be otherwise, such
an assertion is questionable. For example, Oregon, where approval is
required, has had at least 180 appeals from the decisions by the LCDC
since 1977 in the state supreme court and courts of appeals. 87 In com-
parison, Washington has had at least sixty appeals from decisions by
hearings boards since 1995 in the state supreme court and courts of ap-
peals.88 These numbers show that the number of appeals for each state
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. However, Steve Hodes provided a good assessment of why regional boards do not neces-
sarily lead to more flexibility or sovereignty for local governments:
Basically the key reason they could live with the act was its flexibility, because so much
of it was defined at the local level. I would say that there was some sense in which this
was an entirely-a little disingenuous quality to this because it was clear from the begin-
ning, by the drafters, that what you were developing was a kind of web of regulations. It
wasn't that any particular regulation would take you in the right direction. It was the
enormous complexity and the diverse regulations that would push you toward good be-
havior, good performance, and maybe ultimately even toward a more centralized sys-
tem-just because it would be too difficult to operate with so many regulations rather
than asking someone to interpret them for you.
Interview by Rita R. Robison with Steve Hodes, policy advisor to Gov. Booth Gardner, 1988-1992
and to Gov. Mike Lowry, 1993-96 (Aug. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralHistory/pdf/OH82I .pdf.
87. Searched Westlaw within Oregon case database, "ti("land conservation and development
commission")" (Sept. 22, 2006).
88. Searched Westlaw within Washington case database, "ti("growth management")" (Sept.
22, 2006).
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was nearly the same on a per-decade basis, revealing no real difference
in the overall amount of litigation between the two approaches.
In addition to judicial appeals of board decisions, a hearing before a
regional board in Washington itself arguably mirrors the litigation proc-
ess, while Oregon takes an administrative approach. If the petitions to
the hearings boards were included in the litigation statistics, Washing-
ton's dispersed approach is several-fold more litigious than Oregon's.
Moreover, one may validly assume that the certainty provided by an ex-
ecutive decision establishing validity as in Oregon would be preferable to
the uncertainty created in Washington by the persistent question of
whether a local decision is valid and will be appealed. Because Wash-
ington's approach is more litigious and uncertain, the dispersed approach
provides much less assurance that the GMA goals and requirements will
be upheld.
(b) How Significant is the Difference
Between Centralized and Dispersed?
Washington politicians enacted a dispersed approach without a
government enforcement "watchdog," in stark contrast to Oregon's cen-
tralized legislation. The argument that carried the political day was that
Oregon's approach was over-centralized, even authoritarian. 89 It can be
said that Oregon did not allow for the differences between metropolitan
and rural counties, or for how different those two populations could be.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the extent of centralization in Ore-
gon's design, and whether Washington's GMA is as dispersed as this
Article may suggest. In the end, is the difference between the two sys-
tems semantic? Or is one solution more efficacious than the other?
Though Oregon's system does contain elements of local control, it
remains quite centralized. Under that system, each county is required to
establish urban growth boundaries and comprehensive plans consistent
with state-wide planning goals. 90 These plans are then forwarded to the
LCDC for review and approval. 9' The approval requirement strikes crit-
ics as state planning and therefore centralized. However, even the LCDC
approval requirement does not conclusively indicate that Oregon's ap-
proach is centralized. Local governments still retain the authority to cre-
ate comprehensive plans and to adopt development regulations that fulfill
89. Interview by Rita R. Robinson with Joe King, former Speaker of the Wash. House of Rep-
resentatives, 1986-92 (Aug. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH811.pdf.
90. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 197.040, .225, .230 (2005).
91. Id. § 197.090(2)(a).
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those plans. 92 The LCDC cannot make the plans or adopt the develop-
ment regulations; rather, the LCDC can only make a determination
whether the plans or regulations fulfill the growth management goals.
Because of this local governmental authority, whether Oregon's system
is truly centralized depends on the deference owed to local decisions. If
the agency must give broad deference to local decisions, nearly all local
decisions will be upheld, but if the agency reviews local decisions de
novo, or without deference to local decisions, then the approach is very
centralized. In actuality, Oregon law affords the LCDC great discretion
over whether a local decision complies with the growth management
goals because no burden is assigned to any party.93 The LCDC also has
the authority to create new growth management goals. 94 Because of this
lack of deference to local decision making, Oregon's scheme is central-
ized and contains mechanisms for enforcement.
Though Oregon's scheme should be considered centralized, all
schemes that require state approval need not be centralized. If the state
review body was required to use the standard of review of "arbitrary and
capricious," the body would only overturn a local government's decision
when the local government exercised a blatant disregard for the facts or
law-the most extreme of cases. Great deference such as the arbitrary
and capricious standard would provide extraordinary room for local dis-
cretion. Certainly this approach would be much more dispersed than
centralized, while still having an element of state approval.
In Washington, while there- is no mandated state approval, the hear-
ings boards do act in a similar capacity over singular issues within the
context of compliance with the GMA. Since 1997, the hearings boards
have applied the "clearly erroneous" standard of review.95 This is some-
thing more than the "substantial evidence" standard under the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, but less than arbitrary and capricious. 96 Thus,
whether Washington's scheme is centralized or dispersed hinges on other
factors.
Among the factors proponents point to when labeling the GMA as
dispersed is the presumption that local actions are "valid upon adop-
tion. 97 But "valid upon adoption" is not an assignment of burden of
92.Id. § 197.010.
93. Id. § 197.090(2)(a).
94. Id. §§ 197.040(i)(c), .040(2)(a).
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(3) (2006).
96. See id. § 34.05.
97. Id. § 36.70A.320(1).
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proof, a quantum of proof, or a standard of review. Rather, the require-
ment is a procedural one. Oregon could have just as easily had this pre-
sumption and yet their approach would still be centralized if the LCDC
afforded no deference to the local decisions.
Additionally, several requirements suggest that the GMA is more
centralized than generally believed. First, all comprehensive plans must
be submitted to CTED, which does not approve local government deci-
sions but does provide comments to the local governments about their
plans.98 These CTED comments are important in citizens' petitions to
hearings boards for review of the comprehensive plans. Second, the gov-
ernor can grant standing to private citizens who do not meet the statutory
requirements, thus demonstrating another element of central control over
the GMA. 99 Third, the Office of Financial Management acts as a cen-
tralized agency under the GMA by establishing a projected twenty-year
population range, within which the counties must size their urban growth
areas. 100 Fourth, there are exhaustive statutory requirements mandating
study and development of regulations for housing, transportation, rural
areas, and natural resource areas,10' as well as requirements for review
and revision of the county's growth plan. 10 2 Finally, the GMA goals
themselves constrain local actions. Each of these factors tends to indi-
cate a more centralized approach.
Despite these more centralized requirements, the fact that Washing-
ton does not require state-approval remains an important distinction
when classifying the GMA as centralized or dispersed. For instance, the
hearings boards only hear particular issues and assess whether those
components of the local action comply with the GMA; they do not con-
sider entire comprehensive plans. Moreover, the board must wait for
petitions before it can act. This means that noncompliant local actions
can escape scrutiny until and unless a challenge is brought. Because
there is a sixty-day window for individuals to petition the hearings
boards, there is little opportunity for hearings boards to review these
noncompliant local actions. 0 3 In addition, citizens may know about non-
compliant actions, but they may be ambivalent or even support the non-
compliance.
98. Id. § 36.70A.040.
99. Id. § 36.70A.280(2)(c).
100.Id. § 36.70A.I 10(2).
101.Id. § 36.70A.070.
102. Id. §§ 36.70A.130, .215.
103. Id. § 36.70A.290(2).
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Proponents of categorizing Washington's GMA as dispersed also
point to the fact that the GMA only gave CTED authority to create
guidelines for designation of agricultural, forest, and mineral resource
areas. 104 There is some debate over what local governments must do to
comply with the guidelines. Most consider the guidelines merely advi-
sory and feel that local governments need only "consider" them. In con-
trast to such advisory guidelines, a growth management law that gives an
agency rulemaking authority, such as Oregon's, would be more central-
ized. However, the fact that the Washington plan includes no rulemak-
ing authority does not necessarily mean that it can best be described as
dispersed. The hearings boards are still charged with interpreting the
GMA and may need to create judicial tests.10 5 Consequently, the discre-
tion afforded to hearings boards to create judicial tests will impact the
degree to which the GMA is centralized or dispersed.
It might also be contended that since the legislative intent was for
the GMA to have a dispersed approach, any greater discretion by hear-
ings boards violates GMA policy and intent. However, such an interpre-
tation would run counter to other GMA legislative policies, such as pro-
tecting farmland and critical environmental areas. Rather than focus on
the semantics of "bottom-up" or "top-down," courts should consider
which approach best serves the explicit GMA goals. Where the GMA
lands on the continuum from absolutely centralized to absolutely dis-
persed largely depends on judicial interpretations of the extent to which
CTED rules are binding and on the powers of hearings boards to create
judicial tests. The success of NGOs to enforce the GMA requirements
will largely depend on these court decisions.
D. Organizations
The various methods of enforcement associated with the GMA are
generally carried out by the organizations and public interest groups as-
sociated with the GMA. Three organizations are important to the dis-
persed versus centralized distinction and the assurance that local
104.Id. § 36.70A.131.
105. See City of Bremerton v. Kitsap County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-0039c
(Oct. 6, 1995). Decisions of the hearings boards are published on the Boards' website at
http://www.gmhb.wa.gov and are available on Westlaw. Case number format is "XX-X-XXXX"
where the first two digits represent the year the petition was filed, the last four digits represent order
in which the petitioned was filed, and the middle digit represents which board the case is before.
The Eastern Board is "1," the Western Board is "2," and the Central Board is "3." For the purposes
of this Article, Board decisions are cited as follows: "abbreviated caption, GMHB No. XX-X-
XXXX, Decision at xx (date)."
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legislative actions comply with GMA goals and requirements. These
organizations are: (1) the Growth Management Hearings Boards; (2) the
CTED; and (3) public interest groups, principally Futurewise.
1. Growth Management Hearings Boards
The GMA created the three hearings boards to hear petitions which
allege that a local legislative action fails to comply with the GMA.
These boards are geographically based: (1) the Central Puget Sound
Growth Management Hearings Board (Central Board), covering Snoho-
mish, King, and Pierce counties; (2) the Western Washington Growth
Management Hearings Board (Western Board), covering all western
Washington counties except for those covered by the Central Board; and
(3) the eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board, cover-
ing counties in eastern Washington. 106 The hearings boards are com-
posed of members, each of whom was appointed by the governor to a
six-year term. 107 Additionally, the GMA requires that there be at least
one lawyer and one former local government official with planning ex-
perience on each board.
108
2. CTED
Prior to enactment of the GMA, the CTED was primarily tasked
with encouraging international trade and foreign investment from Asian
countries as well as encouraging economic development through county
port districts.'0 9 The GMA altered the role of the CTED, however, giv-
ing it the burden of growth management oversight. The CTED's duties
include the following: (1) reviewing each comprehensive plan and pro-
viding comments to the local government; 10 (2) granting extensions to
local governments for compliance with comprehensive planning timeta-
bles;11' (3) designating agricultural, forest, mineral resource, and critical
areas;" 2 (4) creating timetables for comprehensive plan submittal;" 3 (5)
adopting guidelines for the designation of agricultural, forest, mineral
resource, and critical areas;" 4 (5) providing mediation when cities dis-
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.250 (2006).
107. Id. § 36.70A.260.
108. Id.
109. Shelby Scates, The Rise and Fall ofJohn Anderson, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May
20, 1990, at E2.
110. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.040(1), .040(6),.106 (2006).
111. Id. § 36.70A.380.
112.Id. § 36.70A.170.
113.Id. § 36.70A.045.
114. Id. § 36.70A.050.
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agree with their county's UGA designation; 115 (6) providing a schedule
for counties to review and revise comprehensive plans;' 16 (7) creating
model mineral resource land development regulations;' 1 7 (8) collecting
the counties' five year reports; 1 8 (9) establishing a technical assistance
and grant program; 19 (10) managing a granting program;120 (11) provid-
ing mediation upon the governor's request in the event that a county fails
to adopt county-wide planning policies;' 2' (12) providing a list of meth-
ods used by counties in creating their county-wide planning policies and
reporting this to the Legislature; 122 (13) receiving decisions made by the
superior courts on cases appealed from the hearings boards; 123 and (14)
undertaking pilot projects to determine whether the several statutorily
required environmental reviews can be streamlined. 124 Though this list
of duties is relatively extensive, it is generally limited to providing guid-
ance. Instead of taking the centralized approach of Oregon, where each
local comprehensive plan is approved by the LCDC, Washington limited
the CTED to providing guidance to local governments regarding their
comprehensive plans. 1
25
3. Public Interest Groups and Futurewise
One of the most prominent and effective means of enforcing the
GMA are the actions of public interest groups, particularly a group now
called Futurewise. Early on in the creation of the GMA, Joe King, then
Speaker of the Washington State House of Representatives, received ad-
vice from Oregon to establish a non-profit organization whose mission
was to aid with local government planning and to enforce the GMA.
126
Several key players involved in the 1990 and 1991 GMA enactments
115. Id. § 36.70A.190(5).
116. Id. §§ 36.70A.130(4), .130(5)(b), .130(5)(c).
117.Id. § 36.70A.131(2).
118.Id. § 36.70A.180(2).
119. Id. §§ 36.70A.190, .210(6).
120.1d. § 36.70A.500.
121. Id. § 36.70A.210(2)(d).
122. Id. § 36.70A.210(5).
123.Id. § 36.70A.295(6).
124. Id. § 36.70A.385.
125. Compare WASH. REV. CODE §36.70A.050 (2006) with OR. REV. STAT. § 197.040 (2005).
126. Interview with Joe King, former Speaker of the Wash. House of Representatives, (Aug. 3,
2005), stating that Oregon Republican Senator Stafford Hansell told King, "You also need to set up a
strong watchdog group."
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helped found "1000 Friends of Washington" in 1990.127 In 2005, 1000
Friends of Washington changed its name to Futurewise.1
28
Today, Futurewise has a board of directors with 23 members and 13
employees. 129  Mary McCumber serves as the board's president, and
there is a full-time executive director and three part-time field directors
based in Snohomish, Skagit, and Spokane counties who work with local
citizens and governments concerning planning, resource protection, and
community building.130  When amendments of comprehensive plans or
development regulations are proposed or required, the field directors help
mobilize local discussion and action.13 1 The field directors play a vital
role in relaying grassroots information to Futurewise's main office, lo-
cated in Seattle. The planning director, legal director, urban policy direc-
tor, executive director, and the relevant regional field director discuss
currently pending amendments of comprehensive plans, how to commu-
nicate Futurewise's position to the local government, and when litigation
is necessary. 3 2 An advisory board to the legal team also helps determine
when litigation is necessary and develops broader litigation strategies. 133
Although there is no statutory language in the GMA creating Fu-
turewise, from the beginning the organization has been very much a part
of the GMA. Futurewise has fulfilled a vital role in the GMA's dis-
persed approach to growth management by ensuring local actions are
compliant with the GMA. In many respects, this has made Futurewise
the trustee of the GMA's goals and requirements, albeit an advocate that
is chronically challenged by the fund-raising issues that typically haunt
voluntary and non-government organizations. Indeed, the Futurewise
saga is even more remarkable when measured against the relatively
unlimited financial and political resources of developers.
The first years of Futurewise were primarily focused on institution
building and providing guidance to local governments that were enacting
127. Those involved in the 1990 and 1991 GMA enactments included Joe King, David Brick-
lin, Mary McCumber, and Lucy Steers, among others. McCumber served as the first President,
although the title was quickly ceded to Steers when McCumber took a job with the Puget Sound
Regional Council. Interview by Diane Wiatr with Lucy Steers, president of League of Women Vot-
ers of Seattle, 1987-1997, member of the Growth Strategies Comm'n and founding board member
of Futurewise (Aug. 11, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH827.pdf.
128. See Futurewise, http://www.futurewise.org (last visited Aug. 6, 2007). See also Interview
by Rita R. Robinson with Joe King, former Speaker of the Wash. House of Representatives, 1986-
1992 (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH81l.pdf.
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their first comprehensive plans.134 Joe King viewed the original objec-
tive of Futurewise as a land use group "that studied and provided expert
levels of staffing on growth issues" and would "hold local governments'
feet to the fire .... ,135 When the CTED created its first guidelines for
designating natural resource lands and critical areas, it asked Futurewise
to provide input. Futurewise also litigated before the hearings boards on
a limited basis during the 1990s. 136 The litigation was mostly done via
intervention or filing of amicus curiae briefs in cases already before the
boards.
Despite Futurewise's professed neutral stance on growth, some
people view Futurewise as an antigrowth, environmental group. 137 This
"antigrowth" perception may stem from Futurewise's recent litigation
successes. For example, prior to 2001 Futurewise had a full time plan-
ning director who was a lawyer. A full time legal director was added in
2001, expanding the Futurewise legal team. Futurewise has also estab-
lished a cooperating attorney program for pro bono assistance on pro-
jects. As of August 2006, there were eighteen such cooperating attor-
neys, five of whom were actively involved in cases.
138
Given its budget and reliance on volunteer lawyers, the record of
Futurewise's legal program has been noteworthy. According to Fu-
turewise's records, between 2001 and 2006 its legal team won twenty-
five of thirty petitions before the hearings boards, five of seven before
superior courts, one before the court of appeals, and one before the
Washington Supreme Court. 139 In comparison, other GMA public inter-
est groups won about half of their petitions before the hearings boards,
while developers won only a third of their petitions before the Central
Board. 40  This success framed Futurewise not only as a winner, but by
134. Interview by Rita R. Robinson with Joe King, former Speaker of the Wash. House of
Representatives, 1986-1992 (Aug. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/oralhistory/pdf/OH81 I.pdf.
135. Id.
136. Eleanor Baxendale argued Futurewise's first case, English v. Columbia County Bd of
Comm'rs (Nov. 12, 1993), available at http://www.gmhb.wa.gov/eastern/decisions/1993/31-
02merrilhenglish,fdo, 1-12-93.htm.
137. Interview with Joe King, supra note 134.
138. Internal Futurewise records.
139. Internal Futurewise records.
140. These numbers are based on my personal assessment of outcomes of each case for 1997 to
2006 before the Central Board. Calculations were not tabulated issue-by-issue within each case, but
rather whether one issue was won in a case by a developer or public interest group. Before the Cen-
tral Board, Futurewise won about two-thirds of their cases. Large developers outperformed small
developers, winning about half of their cases. In addition to the out-performance by public interest
groups, public interest groups filed about two-thirds of the petitions for review.
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some people as antigrowth, even though Futurewise has never claimed to
have this as a categorical objective.
While Futurewise has a track record of winning, three recent state
Supreme Court case could jeopardize the group's ability to enforce GMA
goals and requirements through the hearings boards. First, Quadrant v.
State Growth Management Hearings Board141 sets a precedent for less
deference to hearings boards' decisions by appellate courts. 142 Second,
Viking Properties, Inc. v. Holm143 may be construed as forbidding hear-
ings boards from making judicial bright line tests. 44 And third, the court
of appeals in City of Redmond v. Central. Puget Sound Growth Man-
agement Hearings Board (Grubb)145 restricted the ability for hearings
boards to alter the burden of proof through judicial tests. 146 A roll back
of the hearings boards' authority would be a set-back for Futurewise's
attempts to ensure local government compliance with the GMA. Fur-
thermore, the reduced ability for Futurewise and other citizen organiza-
tions to enforce the GMA's goals and requirements through petitions to
the hearings boards would impinge on their ability to act as the GMA's
trustees.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Because the effectiveness of enforcement is one of the most impor-
tant distinctions between a dispersed and centralized approach to growth
management, an analysis of the successes and failures of Futurewise and
developers in relation to the GMA is relevant. The results of the efforts
of these two groups can be seen through statistics showing winning per-
centages as well as case studies involving Futurewise.
A. Study of Winning Percentages
This section discusses the known success rates of Futurewise, pub-
lic interest groups, and developers before the hearings boards. In order
to arrive at a basic understanding of the success of Futurewise, public
interest groups, and developers, the author analyzed all the decisions
made by the Central Board since 1997. The outcomes of the cases since
the 1997 GMA amendments provide relevant statistical information as to
the success of public interest groups versus developers before the hearing
141. 119 Wash. App. 562, 81 P.3d 918 (2003).
142. See id.
143. 155 Wash.2d 112, 118 P.3d 322 (2005).
144. Id. at 129, 118 P.3d at 331.
145. 116 Wash. App. 48, 65 P.3d 337 (2003).
146. Id. at 58, 65 P.3d at 342.
[Vol. 3 1:1
2007] Enforcement of Growth Management controls
boards. The following table tabulates the case outcomes for petitioning
parties before the Central Board since the 1997 amendments.
Table 1: Winning percentages of Public Interest Groups versus Developers
between 1997 and August 2006, with subcategories. 147 148
Big Develop-
Public Interest Futurewise ers1
49
Groups Subcategory of Developers Subcategory ofPublic Interest Developers
Year W L W L W L W L
1997 2 3 1 - 1 3 1 1
1998 4 4 1 - 2 - 2
1999 - 7 - - 1 1 1 1
2000 6 4 - - 1 1 1 -
2001 9 1 - - 1 4 1 2
2002 3 6 - - 1 2 1 -
2003 64 7 3 - - 2 -
147. Analysis conducted on August 1, 2006 by Brock Howell (see acknowledgement, supra
note t). To conduct this analysis, the decisions and orders were copied from Central Boards' web-
site to an Excel spreadsheet. Once the information was sorted and edited, each case since 1997 was
reviewed. After each review, the winner-the petitioner or the respondent-was marked. The tabu-
lations indicate the success and failure of public interest groups versus developers. Any case in
which the board found in favor of any of the petitioner's arguments was counted as a win for the
petitioner. Counting each of the issues would be far too difficult, would not reflect the fact that
petitioners have a tendency to over-plead issues, and would not reflect the fact that not all issues are
disposed of. Both procedural and substantive wins were counted. Board decisions pursuant to a
court reversal and remand were ignored as the survey was directed at what the board independently
decided, not what it was told to do.
148. The table has a number of limitations: (1) As petitioners often make numerous arguments,
each with varying worthiness and impact, there is likely a greater percentage of "wins" than are truly
present; (2) Because there is varying impact of each winning argument, it is difficult to assess
whether developers or public interest groups are more effective in their petitions;(3) Not included in
the tabulations are cases that were dismissed due to settlement agreements. The impact of these
cases, positive or negative, towards the desires of public interest groups are unknown without much
more detailed analyses; (4) Negotiations prior to adoption of comprehensive plans and development
regulations were not considered. As a result, the success of developers versus public interest groups
is hard to know; (5) At least one case was left out because it was unclear whether to classify the
petitioning party as a developer or public interest group; and (6) There is no good definition for a
"public interest group," and not all groups are altruistic in serving as the GMA's trustees.
149. Large developers include Cosmos Development Corporation (co-petitioner with Benaroyo
Shareholders Trust & Universal Holdings Partnership), Port of Seattle, Chevron, Port Blakely Tree
Farms, Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Company, Mac Angus Ranches, Home Builders Association of
Kitsap County, Master Builders Association of King & Snoqualmie Counties, Boeing, Seattle-King
County Association of Realtors, Camwest Development, Overton & Associates, and Safeway.
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2004 9 4 4 2 1 5 15
2005 5 6 2 3 4 8 2 5
2006 1 3 1 3 - - - -
TOTALS 45 45 12 7 13 28 9 10
WIN % 50.0% 66.6% 31.7% 47.4%
Of the thirteen cases won by developers discussed in the table
above, only four were won by small developers. In other words, 69.2%
of the cases won by developers were won by large developers. This sug-
gests that larger developers with greater financial wherewithal and legal
experience have a much greater chance at success, but even then the
winning percentage for large developers is less than that of public inter-
est groups. That is not to suggest that these winning percentages provide
a complete picture. In fact, many developers' victories are achieved out-
side of the judicial system through negotiation for favorable ordinances
and amendments to the comprehensive plans. Nonetheless, as the table
reflects, while large developers have experienced some success in their
petitions, public interest groups have apparently done better.
Although other public interest groups have done well in petitions
before the growth management boards, Futurewise has arguably done the
best. Of the twenty cases won by public interest groups between 2003
and 2006, eleven were won without Futurewise's aid. Furthermore,
other petitioning parties participated in six of the cases won by Fu-
turewise, indicating that public interest groups could have won seventeen
of the twenty cases without Futurewise. However, Futurewise was far
more efficient in winning their cases than their brethren between 2003
and 2006. Non-Futurewise groups posted a success rate of 45.8% while
Futurewise boasted 64.3%. Non-Futurewise groups managed merely
eleven wins in twenty-four tries while Futurewise earned nine in four-
teen. Additionally, Futurewise contributed only five losses to the eight-
een lost by public interest groups.
Futurewise's litigation also has another advantage over other public
interest groups. While most public interest groups merely attack an indi-
vidual problem when it comes along, Futurewise plans its appeals and
petitions with a broader purpose. For example, Futurewise is currently in
the midst of pursuing several petitions before the three growth manage-
ment boards. These petitions pursue three goals: (1) identifying gener-
ally prohibited densities inside and outside the UGAs; (2) defining the
differences between the multiple review and evaluation procedures as
prescribed in sections 36.70A.130 and .215 of the Revised Code of
Washington; and (3) establishing a framework and working definition of
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Enforcement of Growth Management controls
"limited area of more intense rural development" ("LAMIRD")."5 ° As a
consequence, Futurewise's broader scope likely has a more meaningful
impact on the interpretation of the GMA than the ad hoc approach by the
uncoordinated litigation of the other public interest groups.
Overall, using the dataset from above, petitioners won 43.7% of
their cases before the growth board. This high percentage of wins is sur-
prising considering that county and city decisions are "presumed valid"
and only overturned if "clearly erroneous."'1 51 While hearing boards may
be exercising excessive discretion, the high percentage of wins may be
due to effective litigation by petitioners, disdain by local governments in
complying with the GMA, or a combination of the two. Also, there is
likely an over-representation of wins in the tabulation. 1
52
The difference in winning percentages between public interest
groups and developers can largely be seen as a result of the GMA
framework. The GMA relies on public interest groups to protect the
GMA's interests of protecting the environment, farming, forestry, and
community character. When a county fails to comply with these re-
quirements, public interest groups are much more likely to file a petition
for review than a developer; developers are most likely to seek review to
protect the GMA's private property rights goal. 53 While developers are
not necessarily opposed to protection of critical environmental, agricul-
tural, or forest land, the fact is that development regulations restrict the
ability of developers to pursue their desired development. Therefore,
interests that restrict development are much more likely to be protected
by the actions of public interest groups.
However, while developers may seek review most often based on
the goal of bolstering private property rights, they may find that such an
approach is not especially successful. This is particularly true given that
local governments have the statutory authority to balance the GMA's
thirteen goals as they see fit. 154 Additionally, the GMA provides several
requirements to protect resources and critical areas and encourage urban
development but provides no requirement to further the GMA goal of
protecting private property rights. Thus, developers hoping to overturn
unfavorable regulations before the board in the name of property rights
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(d) (2006).
151. Id § 36.70A.320.
152. The reasons for the potential over-representation of wins is discussed supra note 147.
153. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(6).
154. Vashon-Maury v. King County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-0008c Decision at
89 (Oct. 23, 1995).
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must contend with board discretion that is, again, more favorable to pub-
lic interest groups.
In order to overcome the obstacles presented by the boards, devel-
opers often resort to the local legislative process, making it more difficult
to discern how well the GMA is being enforced. When creating devel-
opment restrictions, local governments are much more likely to pass
rules that are less restrictive, where county and city councils are not
likely to ignore the pressures for increasing economic development. De-
velopers have facilitated such conversations and negotiations with local
legislators through successful litigation of procedural issues, such as pub-
lic notice and participation requirements. 155 Because private conversa-
tions and negotiations between local legislators and developers are un-
quantifiable, it is hard to know whether public interest groups are indeed
winning in their battle to protect the GMA. It is also hard to know if re-
liance on public interest organizations to enforce the GMA is as effective
as Oregon's centralized system and its legislatively mandated enforce-
ment mechanisms.
B. Futurewise Case Studies
Three cases demonstrate how Futurewise and other NGOs enforce
GMA goals. A short description of these cases places the dispersed ap-
proach of the GMA, as well as the importance of the burdens of proof
and standards of review in perspective.
In Citizens for Good Governance v. Walla Walla County,156 the ac-
tions of Futurewise helped protect thousands of acres of farmland. In
that case, the county had adopted a comprehensive plan in 2001 and de-
velopment regulations in 2002, both of which allowed for urban densities
in rural and critical areas.157 In addition, while the regulations estab-
lished a LAMIRD adjacent to a designated urban growth area, they failed
to properly designate and conserve agricultural land of long-term com-
mercial significance. 158 Futurewise, Citizens for Good Governance, and
the City of Walla Walla petitioned the Eastern Board to review both the
comprehensive plan and development regulations.159 The Eastern Board
155. E.g., Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Co. v. City of DuPont, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No.
98-3-0035 (May 19, 1999).
156. Citizens for Good Governance v. Walla Walla County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB Nos.
01-1-0014cz & 01-1-0015c (May 1, 2002).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Citizens for Good Governance v. Walla Walla County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB Nos.
01-1-0014cz & 01-1-0015c (May 1, 2002); City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla County, Final Dec.
& Order, GMHB No. 02-1-0012c (Nov. 26, 2002).
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found the comprehensive plan and development regulations were non-
compliant with the GMA.160  After appealing to the superior court and
then to the court of appeals,161 the County finally relented and settled
with respect to the rural land, critical area, and LAMIRD issues. 62 The
County eventually lost on remand as to the agricultural protection issues
and is now in compliance with the GMA.163 This case helped protect
approximately 9,000 acres of rural land and over 700,000 acres of farm-
land.
Another example of a Futurewise success is Hensley v. Snohomish
County. 64 In Hensley, Snohomish County had enacted a comprehensive
plan that expanded the Arlington urban growth area by 110 acres when;
(1) the expansion was not necessary; (2) the area was subject to signifi-
cant and frequent flooding; and (3) the area met all the GMA criteria for
agricultural land of long-term commercial significance. 65 Additionally,
the county converted 218 acres of farmland to a ten-acre ranchette devel-
opment and redesignated nine acres of undeveloped rural land as
LAMIRD to allow a multi-service truck stop along Interstate Five.'
66
After much litigation, Futurewise was able to overturn these actions, re-
160. Citizens for Good Governance v. Walla Walla County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB Nos.
01-1-0014cz & 01-1-0015c (May 1, 2002); City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla County, Final Dec.
& Order, GMHB No. 02-1-0012c (Nov. 26, 2002).
161. Walla Walla County v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., Superior Court Case No.
02-2-00337-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2002) (unpublished opinion); Walla Walla County v. E. Wash.
Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., Court of Appeals Case No. 21552-1-Ill (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (un-
published opinion).
162. Citizens for Good Governance v. Walla Walla County, Order on Compliance, GMHB
Nos. 01-1-0014cz & 01-1-0015c(Dec. 23, 2002); Citizens for Good Governance v. Walla Walla
County, Order on Compliance, GMHB Nos. 0l-l-0014cz & 01-1-0015c (Aug. 30, 2003).
163. City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla County, Order on Remand, GMHB No. 02-1-
0012c(Dec. 16, 2003); City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla County, Third Order on Compliance,
GMHB No. 02-1-0012c(Mar. 10, 2005); City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla County, Order Finding
Compliance, GMHB No. 02-1-0012c(Aug. 1, 2006).
164. Hensley v. Snohomish County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 03-3-0009c (Sept. 22,
2003); Hensley v. Snohomish County, Order Finding Validity of Prior Plan Provisions and Rescind-
ing Invalidity, GMHB No. 03-3-0009c (Oct. 13, 2003); Hensley v. Snohomish County, Order on
Reconsideration, GMHB No. 03-3-0009c (Oct. 21, 2003); Snohomish County v. Hensley, Ct. of
App. Case No. 55693-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished opinion, reversing Snoho-
mish County Superior Court decision).
165. Hensley v. Snohomish County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 03-3-0009c (Sept. 22,
2003); Hensley v. Snohomish County, Order Finding Validity of Prior Plan Provisions and Rescind-
ing Invalidity, GMHB No. 03-3-0009c (Oct. 13, 2003); Hensley v. Snohomish County, Order on
Reconsideration, GMHB No. 03-3-0009c (Oct. 21, 2003); Snohomish County v. Hensley, Ct. of
App. Case No. 55693-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished opinion, reversing Snoho-
mish County Superior Court decision).
166. Hensley v. Snohomish County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 03-3-0009c (Sept. 22,
2003).
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suiting in the protection of agricultural land from inclusion as an urban
growth area. 
167
Still another example of Futurewise's attempts to enforce the
GMA's goals is 1000 Friends of Wash. v. Thurston County.168 There, the
County had updated its comprehensive plan in 2004, permitting 60 per-
cent more population growth than necessary within its urban growth
area. 169 Also, the County's updated plan significantly under-designated
agricultural land of long-term commercial significance while maintaining
more than 21,000 acres of rural land at densities of one unit per five
acres. 170  The Western Board found each of these provisions failed to
comply with certain GMA requirements, although the provisions did not
violate the GMA goals.' 7' The County appealed the decision to superior
court and then sought and received a growth board certification to file the
case with the court of appeals.17 2 Before the court of appeals officially
accepted the case, the County filed a petition with the Washington State
Supreme Court to accept direct review, which is still pending. 173
The winning percentages and these case examples provide some in-
sight into how Futurewise and other public interest groups have per-
formed as unofficial GMA trustees through petitions to hearings boards.
The future success of these GMA trustees rests greatly upon how boards
and courts continue to interpret burdens of proof and standards of review
when considering petitions in light of the Legislature's intent for a dis-
persed approach to growth management.
167. Hensley v. Snohomish County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 03-3-0009c (Sept. 22,
2003); Hensley v. Snohomish County, Order Finding Validity of Prior Plan Provisions and Rescind-
ing Invalidity, GMHB No. 03-3-0009c (Oct. 13, 2003); Hensley v. Snohomish County, Order on
Reconsideration, GMHB No. 03-3-0009c (Oct. 21, 2003); Snohomish County v. Hensley, Ct.. of
App. Case No. 55693-2-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished opinion, reversing Snoho-
mish County Superior Court decision).
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VI. CONCLUSION
"Upon this point a page of history is worth a volume of
logic.'
174
The lesson of Washington's way of combating sprawl can perhaps
be best summed up by this quote: "You fight [sprawl] with the [laws]
you have ... [,] not the [laws] you might want or wish to have at a later
time." 1 75 Interestingly, Oregon's centralized plan triggered a taxpayer
revolt resulting in a law that now seriously hampers growth management
by requiring authorities to pay taxpayers whenever they restrict the use
of their land. 176  Though Washington landowners seeking to exploit
every square inch of their property backed a similar referendum requiring
payment as a consequence of growth management restrictions, that effort
was soundly defeated.
177
Washington's GMA lacks the symmetry and logic of the Oregon
plan, but arguably the role of the public in its enforcement is the key to
its survival when faced with the political opposition designed to impede
it. A reliance on citizen enforcement has the virtue of deflecting what
might emerge as anger against a government bureaucracy, a problem the
Washington GMA does not have. On the other hand, the somewhat
weak Washington GMA adjusts itself to local politics in a way that
sometimes creates political and developer pressure, especially on local
officials reluctant to invoke the GMA at all. Despite the litigation
174. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
175. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, in a town hall meeting with soldiers in Kuwait.
U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs), Dec. 8, 2004, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1980 ("As you know, you go to
war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later
time.") Id.
176. On Nov. 2, 2004, Oregon voters passed Ballot Measure 37 by 1,054,589 (61%) to 685,079
(39%). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of Oregon-ballotmeasures. The measure provided that
the owner of private real property is entitled to receive just compensation when a land use regulation
is enacted after the owner or a family member became the owner of the property if the regulation
restricts the use of the property and reduces its fair market value. In lieu of compensation, the
measure also provided that the government responsible for the regulation may choose to "remove,
modify or not apply" the regulation.
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_text.html. The measure became
effective on Dec. 2, 2004,30 days after the election. See also, F. Barringer, Rule Change in Oregon
May Alter the Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at Al. ("Richard J. Lazarus, a law professor
at Georgetown, [speaking just before the vote adopting Measure 37] called the measure a blunt in-
strument that could undermine all zoning and environmental protections and undercut land values").
177. Eric Pryne, Middle Road on Property Rights, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at B 1.
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successes of NGOs such as Futurewise, the future of citizen efforts to
combat sprawl remains tied to the fundraising capacity of organizations
dedicated to defending the GMA. These organizations face a year-to-
year effort to raise enough money to keep their offices open, making it
difficult for them to confront well-connected and well-heeded proponents
of development who may be more concerned with profit than the envi-
ronment or transportation.
Indeed, the history of Washington's GMA suggests that, given the
often unrelenting opposition to the law, the state is lucky to have the
regulation it enjoys at all. A more coherent and official statewide en-
forcement apparatus as exists in Oregon seems out of the question. The
answer to the problems of a dispersed and citizen-enforced system is
supplied more by the history of managed growth's origins in Washington
than it is by legislative logic. At the very least, the Washington scheme
did provide for three Growth Management Hearing Boards which can
hear appeals from local governmental opinions, providing some coher-
ence in the development of the law.
While this Article has briefly discussed the growth management
hearings boards, a forthcoming article will be devoted nearly exclusively
to an analysis of boards' decisions and the impact they have on managed
growth. 7 8 Aside from a vigilant citizenry committed to "smart growth,"
the boards remain the only official agency in the trenches of the anti-
sprawl wars in Washington State.
178. The subsequent Article is scheduled for publication in Issue 3 of this Volume.
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